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Abstract: 
  
The purpose of this research is to test whether management compensation and auditor 
reputation motivate management perform earnings management, its effect on companies 
stock return. This research use companies size, sales growth and financial leverage as 
control variables. The research hypotheses were tested using ordinary least square 
regression.  
 
The sample of this research are companies listed in the Indonesia Stock Exchange from year 
2011 to 2015. The amount of samples that fulfill the criterion are 134 companies. This 
research take 54 companies as other samples for process of comparing with criterion that 
the companies were equal size firm and same industries. The theory that based this research 
is agency theory and signaling theory. The independent variable of earnings management is 
proxied by accrual discretionary and calculated by Modified Jones Model.  
 
This research reveal indeed the management compensation and auditor reputation motivate 
companies management performed earnings management,  and  influence negatively toward 
earnings management. Furthermore, earnings management influence negatively toward 
companies stocks return. 
 
 
Keywords:    auditor’s reputation, earnings management, management compensation, and 
stocks return. 
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1. Introduction Research Background  
 
Performance evaluation is closely related to compensation that will be given to the 
management.  Some studies regarding to management compensation is often related 
to agency theory.  Agency theory views the existence of relation between owner 
(principal) and corporate management (agent).  Principal trusts agent who gives 
his/her managerial service. With the service, the agent will receive compensation 
from the principal. Therefore, compensation is a service value given by corporate 
owner to the management (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). Most of compensation plans 
are based on two manager’s achievements, which are net income and stock price 
(Scott, 2009; Vovchenko et al., 2016). The number of bonus, stock, option, and 
other components of management compensation is evaluated in a certain year 
depending on the performance of net income and/or performance of stock price.  
 
According to Traichal, et al. (1999), the efforts to minimize or to control conflict 
occurring between corporate management and owner (shareholders), one of them is 
by determining a management compensation system properly.  The application of 
proper compensation system is expected to be able to attract and keep competent 
manager by relating the decision to maximize the corporate value.  It is based on the 
idea that if management compensation is determined properly/well, it will promote 
the growth of corporate performance, so it can increase the corporate value, as stated 
by Burchman and Jones (2006). 
 
Lambert (1993) examined the relation between salary and bonus with performance 
based on accounting and stock return. They found that the performance based on 
accounting and stock return explains compensation level moderately. Burshman and 
Indjejikian (1993) also used agency model where a manager has two dimensions of 
action choice to learn on how the content of earnings information affects the design 
of compensation construct based on earnings and stock price (Thalassinos and Liapis 
2014; Stroeva et al., 2015; Robertie, 2016; Havlicek et al., 2013; Breckova and 
Havlicek, 2013).  
 
The relation between accounting earnings and top executive compensation was 
studied by Sloan (1993).  The evidence resulted supported the hypothesis stating that 
incentive based on earnings helps protecting executive from market-wide factors in 
stock price. Earnings reflect the changing of corporate specification in value, but less 
sensitive toward market movement.  As a result, the performance size based on the 
earnings in executive compensation contract helps protecting executive from 
corporate value fluctuation that is in their control. Healy (1985), found the evidence 
of the relation evidence between bonus given to management and accounting 
earnings.  
 
Clinch and Magliolo (1993) analyzed the relation between CEO cash compensation 
of banking firms and accounting earnings from discretionary transaction. The 
analysis result showed that earnings from discretionary transaction relating to cash 
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flow that is reflected on the function of CEO compensation and does not have an 
indication that earnings from discretionary transaction that is not related to cash flow 
affect compensation.  
 
Discretionary transaction is often done by applying earnings management.  In certain 
event, corporate management often determines earnings management policy.  The 
application of earnings management policy is often associated with agency theory.  
Agency theory views that company as a nexus of contracts (Scott, 2009), both in 
written or not.  A contract between management and shareholders is usually based 
on the performance achieved by company.  If the company has poor performance, 
the manager can be considered as the party who breaks the contract, that will be 
receive the consequence from the condition.  Therefore, manager might be 
motivated to conduct earnings management in the process of financial report setting 
by choosing the proper accounting technique and procedure in order to produce 
accounting numbers that are often used as the instrument to evaluate management 
performance.  
 
Other factor that might be able to affect management to conduct earnings 
management is auditor reputation. Teoh and Wong (1993) stated that audit quality 
positive relates to earnings quality that is proven that the user of non-big six auditor 
service tends to report higher earnings by conducting earnings management. It 
means that audit quality negatively relates to earnings management (Zhou and Elder, 
2001).   
 
An auditor is expected to be able to limit the practice of earnings management as 
well as to help keeping and increasing public trust toward information reported in 
financial report.  This thought is based on the perception that an auditor has 
knowledge and ability to analyze whether or not earnings management is conducted 
in the process of financial reporting, as stated by Zaluki (2011) that earnings 
management will be recognized by a highly qualified auditor.   
 
Based on the report made by auditor, financial report users such as shareholders or 
investors and prospective investors, determine the decision related to the involved 
company.  Therefore, auditor reputation is an important variable affecting the 
occurrence of earnings management practice.  
 
Financial report is the means to communicate financial information to the parties 
outside the company.  The financial information is expected to give useful 
information to investors and creditors in making decision related to investment that 
is conducted. In financial report making, the accrual basis is chosen because it is 
more rational and fairer in illustrating the real financial condition of company, 
however, on the other side; the use of accrual basis can give freedom to the 
management in choosing accounting method leading to opportunistic action that 
harms the user of financial report (Macijauskas and Maditinos, 2014).  
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Earnings management can be done because of the existence of management 
intervention in the process of external financial report making in order to achieve 
certain earnings level the aim to benefit themselves (or company).  The opportunity 
to change the earnings appears because accounting method gives the opportunity for 
management to record a certain fact with different ways and the opportunity for 
management to involve the subjectivity in making the estimation (Worthy, 1984).  
For instance, the assets with similar condition can be depreciated with different 
method and with the different estimation of economic age.  Manager is also able to 
change earnings by shifting the period of cost and earnings disclosure (Fischer and 
Rozenzweig, 1995; Pontoh, 2017). 
 
One element of financial report is income statement.  Income statement describes the 
ability of company in obtaining income and showing costs spent for the income.  
The company that produces earnings is more preferable by investors rather than the 
company that has loss.  Earnings also show the size to what extent the success of 
corporate management in managing corporate resources efficiently and effectively. 
Therefore, many tendencies of financial report users to pay attention more on the 
existing earnings in income statement.  If the evaluation of manager’s performance 
is based on only the earnings obtained, it will create dysfunctional behaviour. The 
improper behaviour is done by managers by manipulating earnings in order to be 
evaluated that the managers have increasing individual performance.   
 
Corporate management has expectation that reported accounting numbers in 
financial report are able to affect the evaluation of shareholders, investors, and 
prospective investors so that they will affect corporate market value reflected on 
stock market value (Vogt and Vu, 2000).  However, accounting numbers that are 
reported aggressively, for example very high reported earnings numbers, will ruin 
the corporate value because are not accordance with their economic value.  It is 
caused by the disruption of evaluation process done by investors and prospective 
investors, as the result of the financial information that is reported is not qualified 
resulted by earnings management activity that is done opportunistically.   
 
However, there is the possibility of management action in conducting earnings 
management that can create economic value in the form of expectation return.  It is 
because the goal of earnings management done, one of them is to affect stock price 
in stock market.  Thus, there is the possibility that earnings management affect stock 
return of the company.  Corporate management has expectation that reported 
accounting numbers in financial report are able to affect the evaluation of 
shareholders, investors, and prospective investors, so they will affect the corporate 
market value reflected on stock market value (Vogt and Vu, 2000). 
 
Based on the explanation above, a study regarding to factors that affect the 
application of earnings management needs to be done.  Therefore, this study is 
aimed to disclose the evidence whether management compensation and auditor 
reputation are the dominant factors that affect the emergence of management’s 
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motivation in conducting earnings management, and whether earnings management 
done affects stock return that is needed to be done.  
 
2. Problem Formulation 
 
This study promotes the issue in the field of accounting that leads the occurrence of 
welfare transfer from the principal to the agent, which is the relation of the effect 
between management compensation and auditor reputation with earnings 
management policy as well as the effect of earnings management on corporate value 
measured by stock return.  Specifically, the problems of this study can be formulated 
as the following:  
 
1. Does management compensation negatively affect earnings management?  
2. Does auditor reputation negatively affect earnings management?   
3. Does earnings management negatively affect stock return of company? 
 
2.1 Research Objective  
 
This study has objectives that can be explained as the following:  
1. To obtain empirical evidence whether management compensation relates 
and affects negatively toward earnings management.  
2. To obtain empirical evidence whether auditor reputation relates and affects 
negatively toward earnings management.  
3. To obtain empirical evidence whether earnings management negatively 
affects stock return of company.  
 
3. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development Relation of Earnings 
Management and Agency Theory  
 
The process of financial report making is aimed to be responsible of a responsibility 
to the party who gives the responsibility, in this matter is the management known as 
agent and the party who gives the responsibility is shareholders or owner of the 
company known as the principal.  The relation of these parties is often discussed in 
agency theory.  Agency theory is a theory modeling the contract process between 
two or more people and each party involved in the contract try to obtain the best for 
themselves (Scott, 2009).  
 
Agency theory will solve the problem appearing in agency relation (Eisenhardt, 
1989). The first problem is a) when the wish or the goal of the owner and the agent 
are contrast/different, and b) the existence of difficulty and expensive cost for the 
owner to conduct verification of what really has been done by the agent.  The second 
problem is risk sharing that appears when the owner and the agent have different 
behaviour in viewing the risk.  
 
3.1 Relation of Earnings Management and Signaling Theory  
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Signaling theory assumes that there is information asymmetry between manager and 
shareholders and investors or prospective investors.  Manager is viewed having 
information about the company (inside information) that is not owned by investor 
and prospective investors.  Signaling theory explains the reason of the importance 
that company provides information to public (Wolk et al., 2006).  The information 
can be a financial report, information of corporate policy or other information that 
can be disclosed voluntarily by corporate management.  
 
Financial report is an instrument used by management to attract decision makers.  
Financial report analysis identifies aspects of relevant financial report in investment 
decision.  The decision quality of investors and prospective investors is affected by 
the quality of information disclosed by company in financial report.  The publication 
of corporate financial report is supporting information that can give relevant 
information for decision making.  Some studies indicated that financial report 
analysis and financial variable are useful in making decision (Kaplan and Urwitz, 
1979). 
 
3.2 Relation between Management Compensation and Earnings 
Management  
 
Compensation is the form of good service reward both financially and non-
financially that is received by executive because of the service given to the company 
(Schuler and Huber, 1993).  Financial compensations are for example salary, wage, 
bonus, commission, stock option, insurance, social support, subsidy, holidays and 
time offs.  Meanwhile, non-financial compensations are example interesting task, 
task challenge, task responsibility, opportunity, recognition, goal achievement, as 
well as interesting working environment.  
 
Compensation system is applied and designed to motivate organisation members to 
improve their performance.  Dissatisfaction toward compensation given has the 
effect of dysfunctional action from organisation members including executives.  
Compensation system must be designed efficiently and effectively as well as affect 
organisation member to achieve the goal that has been determined previously.  
 
One basic of compensation system designing is accounting information.  Accounting 
information role as an instrument to evaluate an individual performance is firstly 
developed by Argyris (1952), who studied the consequence of accounting 
information use as an instrument to evaluate the performance of subordinates. The 
question proposed is whether accounting information gives positive effect on the 
improvement of subordinate and company’s performance entirely or vice versa, 
gives negative effect. The result of study concludes that the way to use accounting 
information to evaluate manager’s performance can cause employee/manager having 
tension, vengeance, suspicious to coworkers, anxiety, and lack of confidence.  As 
the result, the use of accounting information as evaluation causes subordinates to 
behave negatively, such as the tendency to manipulate accounting data.  
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The study of Argyris (1952), then is developed by Hopwood (1972) by giving three 
ways to evaluate individual’s achievement, which are: 1) budget constraint style 
(BCS), 2) profit conscious style (PCS), and 3) non accounting style (NAS).  The 
study result of Hopwood (1972) shows the use of accounting information rigidly in 
BCS will cause the increase of subordinate’s tension level (job-related tension) and 
the relation is less harmonious between superior and subordinate or the relation 
among subordinates.  Moreover, manager’s behavior to manipulate numbers in 
budgeting far bigger below BCS compared to others.   
 
The study results are the indication of the existence of relation between 
compensation system and management behaviour.  Accounting information can be 
seen in financial report.  One element of financial report is income statements. 
Income statements describe the ability of the company in obtaining income and 
showing costs spent to obtain the income.  The company producing earnings is more 
preferable by investors compared to the company producing loss.    
 
Earnings also show to what extent the success of corporate management in 
managing corporate resources efficiently and effectively. Therefore, many 
tendencies of financial report users to pay attention more on the earnings in income 
statements.  If the evaluation of manager’s performance is only base on the earnings 
received, it will create improper action (dysfunctional behaviour). The dysfunctional 
behaviour is used by managers to manipulate earnings in order to increase individual 
performance.  
 
The behaviour of executive in manipulating financial report is often known as 
earnings management. Earnings management is management involvement in the 
process of external financial report making in order to achieve certain earnings level 
with the aim to benefit themselves (or company).  The opportunity to report higher 
earnings than should be appears because accounting method allows management to 
record a certain fact with different ways and opportunities for management to 
involve subjectivity in estimation making (Worthy, 1984).  
 
If company applies the compensation policy that is felt fair by management that is 
determined by using various performance evaluation methods that are not only based 
on the achievement of annual earnings, corporate management will tend to report 
earnings in accordance with the actual performance achievement.  Therefore, 
management compensation will relate and affect negatively toward earnings 
management.  
 
3.3 Relation between Auditor Reputation and Earnings Management  
 
The need for reputable auditor service is meant as a bridge between company and 
investors or prospective investors because of the existence of information 
asymmetry.  In the reporting process, reputable auditor is needed to guarantee 
financial data as the basic for decision making in stock market. Beatty (1989) stated 
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that auditor quality is a reduction toward uncertainty that related negatively with 
stock return.   
 
Reputable auditor will prevent management reacting dysfunctional that will harm 
financial report users. In reporting process, there is a possibility of management 
conducting earnings management opportunistically so that it harms the company that 
might affect the corporate value reflected on the price in stock market. The use of 
high reputable auditor service is needed to give information certainty that can be 
believed by investors and prospective investors. Therefore, the use of high reputable 
auditor service is expected to be a positive signal for investors and prospective 
investors who give the belief that the information presented in the financial report is 
reliable information. The higher the reputation of the auditor, the smaller the 
possibility of management in presenting misleading information.  Therefore, the 
higher the reputation of the auditor, the lower the possibility of management in 
conducting earnings management.   
 
3.4 Relation of Earnings Management and Stock Return  
 
As explained previously that one way to evaluate the achievement of organisation 
members is based on profit conscious style (Hopwood, 1972).  It means that the 
evaluation of manager’s performance can be done by viewing the accounting 
information presented in financial report to determine how much compensation 
given the members of the organisation.  Whether the compensation is perceived 
positive (pleasant) or negative (unpleasant), which its indication can be seen from 
the behaviour of executive after receiving the compensation, for example, by 
looking at the corporate performance, such as earnings and stock return in the next 
years.  
 
In addition, it can be concluded that the company producing earnings is more 
preferable by investors compared to the company having loss.  Earnings also show 
the size of what extent corporate management in managing corporate resources 
efficiently and effectively. Therefore, many tendencies of financial report users pay 
more attention to the earnings in income statements.  
 
Based on the reason above, investors will be more interested in conducting 
investment in corporate stock promising the earnings. Therefore, corporate 
management will naturally always try to maintain desirable earnings of investors and 
prospective investors. This effort can be achieved by conducting earnings 
management.   
 
Nevertheless, investors and prospective investors will also try to obtain other 
information to conduct investment evaluation toward corporate stock.  It means that 
investors and prospective investors have the ability to evaluate corporate real 
performance. The attention of investors to a company is done by buying or not the 
corporate stock that is traded in stock market.  
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If investors and prospective investors feel that the information presented by 
management contains misleading information, and if market mechanism runs as it 
should be, the investors’ action is whether or not they buy, sell or keep maintaining 
the stock, it will affect stock market price.  The higher corporate management 
conducts earnings management, investors and prospective investors will evaluate 
that reported earnings information is misleading information, investors and 
prospective investors will then decide to not involving in the corporate stock trading.    
 
Based on the explanations above, hypotheses of this study can be formulated as the 
following:  
Hypothesis 1: Management compensation relates and negatively affects earnings 
management.  
Hypothesis 2: Auditor reputation relates and negatively affects earnings 
management.  
Hypothesis 3: Earnings management relates and negatively affects corporate stock 
return. 
  
4. Research Method Research Sample  
 
Sample used in this study is the companies listed in IDX from 2011 to 2015 based 
on the consideration that in those periods financial fluctuation that can affect the 
movement of stock price extremely did not occur, that eventually will create bias in 
the study result.  Data structure used in this study is cross section data.  
 
4.1 Research Variables and Variable Measurement  
 
The type of this study is empirical study with some hypotheses developed based on 
the research questions that are formulated previously. The research hypotheses 
consist of relation hypotheses (associative) between causal variables, which are H-1, 
H-2, and H-3. 
 
Variables used in this study consist of independent variable and dependent variable. 
The testing with equation I model is variable of management compensation (COMP) 
and auditor reputation (AUDI) as independent variables with earnings management 
(DA) as dependent variable.  The testing with equation II model is earnings 
management (DA) as independent variable and stock return (SR) as dependent 
variable.  Management compensation is measured by the number of expense spent 
by the company for employee expending post for one period reported in financial 
report.  Auditor reputation (AUDI) is a dummy variable.  The determination of 
reputable auditor and disreputable auditor is done by grouping Public Accountant 
Firm (PAF) from the auditor, whether or not it is affiliated with big-four PAF.  This 
study uses discretionary accrual (DA) as the measurement of earnings management 
detected by using modification Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995). According to 
Thomas and Zhang (2000), modification Jones model is the best model to detect 
earnings management if it is compared to other models.  Corporate stock return can 
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be calculated by the ratio between the difference of present period stock price and 
previous period stock price.  
 
4.2 Analysis Model  
 
Analysis model used in this study is regression with equations as the following:  
DA     = a + b11 COMP + b12 AUDI + b13 SIZE + b14 GRO +  b15 LEV + e1i  
RS   =   a2 + b21 DA + b22 SIZE + b23 GRO + b24 LEV + e2i  
 
      4.3   Hypothesis Testing  
 
Hypotheses testing of the first, the second, and the third (H-1, H-2, and H-3) use 
regression analysis (Ordinary Least Square – OLS) to disclose the effect relation of 
independent variable toward dependent variable.  Before all testing are done, classic 
assumption testing is firstly done, and it is necessary to use OLS in the hypotheses 
testing. The testing on this hypothesis is also equipped with the calculation of F 
value (F calculate) with t value (t-calculate) that will be compared with their critical 
value.  F test is done to examine whether or not the model developed in this study 
has been already appropriate (Gujarati and Porter, 2009). 
   
5.  Research Result and Discussion  
 
From the significance testing result of independent variable effect on dependent 
variable by using one sample t test for equation I model, it can be concluded that 
independent variables COMP and AUDI affect significantly (t-calculate is greater 
than t-table).  Independent variables of SIZE, GRO, and LEV do not significantly 
affect dependent variable of DA (t-calculate is smaller than t-table).  In the result of 
testing on equation II model, it can be concluded that independent variable DA 
significantly affects dependent variable RS (t-calculate is greater than t-table).  
 
The testing result toward hypothesis 1 (H-1) that is formulated by the statement that 
there are relation and negative effect between management compensation and 
earnings management, it obtained the result that supports the premise used in this 
study. If compensation is accurately formulated by considering fairness that is able 
to satisfy management, management compensation will reduce or eliminate 
management motivation to conduct earnings management with opportunistic goal 
(Scott, 2009).    
 
The testing result on hypothesis 2 (H-2) that is formulated by the statement that there 
are relation and negative effect between auditor reputation and earnings 
management, it obtained the result disclosing that auditor reputation negatively and 
significantly affects earnings management, that supports the premise used in this 
study.  The premise is that auditor reputation will be able to reduce corporate 
management motivation to conduct earnings management with opportunistic goal.  
An auditor who has high reputation will conduct the task given carefully and full of 
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responsibility reflecting his/her integrity. Auditor who has high reputation will 
conduct examination on corporate financial carefully in accordance with his/her 
independency.  It is also stated by Zaluki et al. (2011) that earnings management 
will be recognised by auditor.  
 
The testing result on hypothesis 3 (H-3) that is formulated by the statement that there 
are relation and negative affect between earnings management and stock return, it 
obtained the result stating that earnings management negatively and significantly 
affect stock return.  It is consistent with the premise used in this study.  Manager will 
always try to report information needed by investors and prospective investors, such 
as the earnings that can be used in conducting estimation to conduct investment in 
the company.  Manager can use discretionary accrual to reflect the performance of 
the company through earnings report (Gul et al., 2003). 
   
6.  Conclusions and Suggestions 
 
The important issue of this study is the presumption regarding to management 
compensation and auditor reputation that are factors affecting earnings management 
and how the effect of earnings management on stock return. The finding disclosing 
that auditor reputation negatively and significantly affects earnings management 
supports the premise used in this study.  The premise is that auditor reputation will 
be able to reduce motivation of corporate management to conduct earnings 
management with opportunistic goal. An auditor who has high reputation will 
conduct the task given carefully and full of responsibility that reflects his/her 
integrity. Auditor who has high reputation will conduct examination on corporate 
financial carefully in accordance with his/her independency.  It is also stated by 
Zaluki et al. (2011) that earnings management activity will be recognised by auditor. 
This study result is consistent with research logical formulated in hypothesis 1 and 
hypothesis 2 (H-1 and H-2). The reason of corporate management to choose 
conducting earnings management and using high reputable auditor is to give positive 
signal to investors and prospective investors by reporting higher earnings so that 
they evaluate and believe that the company has high qualified performance.  
 
This study also disclosed the result that supports the premise used, that earnings 
management done by management is aimed to affect market reaction that is reflected 
in stock price.  The study result disclosing that earnings management negatively and 
significantly affects stock return is consistent with the premise used in this study.  
Manager will always try to report information needed by investors and prospective 
investors, such as earnings that can be used in conducting estimation to conduct 
investment in the company.  Manager can use discretionary accrual to reflect the 
performance of the company through earnings report (Gul et al., 2003).  This study 
is expected to be able to give suggestion to regulator parties to control companies in 
conducting financial reporting so that it does not create adverse motivation for 
investors.  It will allow financial report reported by IPO companies to be able to 
create belief for investors or prospective investors.  Regulator parties are also 
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expected to be able to determine the rating of auditor reputation that can be believed 
by auditor service users including the company whose stock is traded in stock 
market.  
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